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Abstract
We examine an open economy’s strategy to reduce its carbon emissions by replacing its
consumption of coal—very carbon intensive—with gas—less so. Unlike the standard ana-
lysis of carbon leakage, unilateral carbon-reduction policies with more than one carbon
energy source may turn counter-productive, ultimately increasing world emissions. Thus,
we establish testable conditions as to whether a governmental emission-reduction com-
mitment warrants the exploitation of gas, and whether such a strategy increases global
emissions. We also characterize the extent to which this unilateral policy makes the rest
of the world’s emission commitments more difficult to meet. Finally, we apply our results
to the case of the US.
JEL classification: Q41; Q58; H73; F18
Keywords: Unilateral climate policy; Carbon emission reduction; Shale gas; Gas-coal
substitution; Coal exports; Carbon leakage; US policy; Counter-productive policy
I. Introduction
Natural gas is the fossil fuel that releases the least CO2 when burned. Now more than
ever, it is hoped that a large replacement of very carbon intensive fuels by shale gas
can help reduce carbon emissions and, therefore, significantly mitigate a climate problem
labeled “the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century” (Stavins, 2011).
For example, an increasing number of top CO2 emitting countries that are endowed
with substantial shale gas deposits plan to meet their emission reduction commitments
by promoting this resource; among them, the US, Russia, China, and the UK. This
substitution is mostly manifest in the power generation sector in which electricity can
be economically produced from both steam coal and natural gas. In a sufficiently long-
run perspective, over which the appropriate infrastructure can be built, gas can virtually
replace coal and other traditional fuels for all uses.
The hope that shale gas can play a major role in national climate policy strategies
has been substantiated by academic experts—e.g., the MIT report of Jacoby, O’Sullivan,
and Paltsev (2011). Not surprisingly, this option is also supported by the industry, which
is an evident implementation advantage over traditional climate mitigation strategies.1
However, two important aspects of the rise of shale gas have raised serious questions
about its climate impact. The first—and most obvious—one concerns the net relative
contribution of gas to global warming, once the leakage of methane at the production
level is taken into account. This first aspect has been addressed in the field of natu-
ral sciences and raises specific regulatory challenges.2 Although our results will connect
with the relative climate impact of gas,3 our analysis deals more directly with the second
concerning aspect of the rise of gas: international coal leakage. For example, according
1BP, BG Group, Eni, Statoil and Total recently declared in a joint letter to media (June 1, 2015): “We
urge governments to take decisive action at December’s UN summit. We are also united in believing
such action should recognize the vital roles of natural gas and carbon pricing in helping to meet the
world’s demand for energy more sustainably.”
2For a synthetic review on this aspect and on the perspective of regulating the leakage
of methane due to fracking, see, for example, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
epa-will-regulate-methane-emissions-from-oil-and-gas-wells/.
3Our application will consider the absence of scientific consensus around this parameter.
to Light, Kolstad, and Rutherford (1999), the international competitive market for coal
implies a particularly high leakage potential. By contrast, the transport of gas—in par-
ticular, its shipment—is highly more challenging, which explains that gas is still virtually
all consumed where it is produced. As a consequence, the domestic replacement of coal
by shale gas releases amounts of tradable coal, whose supply meets the foreign energy
demand, and, therefore, contributes to increase emissions in the rest of the world. For
example, the empirical evidence reported in Section II suggests a relationship between
the recent boom of shale gas, the reduction in US CO2 emissions, and the peak in US
coal exports. See also the recent projections by Chakravorty, Fischer, and Hubert (2015)
on the development of shale gas in China.
There are two main reasons why this problem deserves a particular attention in the
context of the current energy landscape. First, in the aftermath of the Paris Climate
Agreement, governments will have to rely on unilateral initiatives to meet their respec-
tive emission reduction commitments. Indeed, in the light of both the agreement and
the preceding COP21 talks, the project of penalizing carbon at the global level in a
coordinated manner seems unrealistic.
The second reason motivates our research more specifically: It is that the rise of gas
as an intermediate (less carbon containing) energy source fundamentally modifies the
analysis of unilateral climate policy. Indeed, with more than one carbon energy source,
our results highlight that a large country’s unilateral emission reduction may ultimately
increase global carbon emissions if it is achieved by promoting an intermediate source of
energy like gas. This theoretical possibility sharply differs from the standard analysis with
a single source of carbon, which predicts that leakage cannot exceed 100%. The difference
may be explained as follows. With a single source of carbon, any carbon penalty—be
it unilateral—causes its total supply to contract; leakage, in that case, reallocates the
consumption of a smaller total carbon quantity. With multiple carbon-generating energy
sources, things are not so simple: A unilateral carbon penalty not only reduces the
total production of the most polluting sources, it may also boost—under some condition
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that we establish—the domestic production of intermediate sources like gas to replace
the domestic consumption of the former. This boost—under another condition that we
establish—may be of such an extent that it more than compensate, at the global level,
the carbon reduction due to the global contraction in the most polluting sources; in this
case, the total quantity of carbon is increased and, therefore, carbon leakage from the
carbon reducing economy is augmented to more than 100% by this economy’s exports of
the most carbon intensive energy sources.
To our knowledge, however, there exists no analysis of unilateral emission reduction
policies with more than one carbon energy source. This is so despite the fact that the
large replacement of coal by gas is a relevant option in several top-emitting regions.
To analyze this new situation, we examine a highly stylized open economy, considering
the minimal set of ingredients involved. There are two regions: the home country and
the rest of the world. The home country relies on two substitutable carbon energy
inputs: coal—more carbon intensive—and gas—less so. By contrast, the rest of the
world cannot use the home country’s gas, but may trade coal with the latter. In each
region, there is a single representative energy consumer and a single firm representative of
the sector supplying carbon energies; their demands and supplies depend on prices only.
Policy-induced leakage corresponds to the displacement of carbon emissions from one
region to another, which results from changes in demand and supply of the representative
consumers and producers.4 In this setup, we address the question whether the domestic
rise of gas can help reduce domestic and global CO2 emissions, and how this rise affects
foreign regions’ ability to meet their own carbon emission commitments. Our analysis
rests on a static representation of the energy market, in the spirit, for example, of Hoel
(1994) and Harstad (2012). In Section VI, however, we explain how our results carry over
to a dynamic setting in which energy sources are endogenously developed and extracted
4The supply and demand functions of representative producers and consumers can be interpreted as
reflecting economic decisions by a continuum of individual agents, each deciding whether to consume or
produce an infinitesimal quantity in each region. Our model would need to be modified to reflect in a
more realistic fashion leakage induced by agents’ decisions to relocate their activity.
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over time.
This paper lies at the intersection of mainly two strands of literature. On the one hand,
it is complementary with recent papers on the leakage effect that limits the effectiveness
of unilateral climate policies—see, among other important contributions, Eichner and
Pethig (2011), Ritter and Schopf (2014), and Fischer and Salant (2017). In general,
leakage only limits, but does not more than compensate, the effect of the unilateral
policy. Indeed, the above studies have focused on the simplifying case in which there is
a single polluting energy source. We extend this literature to the case of more than one
polluting source, which gives rise to the possibility that leakage exceed 100%, so that a
unilateral well-intentioned policy may turn counter-productive. Such a possibility can be
interpreted as the leakage counterpart of the “green paradox” (Sinn, 2008).
On the other hand, this article is complementary with the resource economics litera-
ture that has dealt with the coexistence of several polluting energy sources—see, among
other papers, Chakravorty, Moreaux, and Tidball (2008), Henriet and Schubert (2015),
and Coulomb and Henriet (2017), which examine closed economy situations, as when
policies are implemented at the world level. We extend this literature to the case in
which an open economy implements a climate policy unilaterally.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In Section II, we discuss an important
example: the US climate strategy, the rise of shale gas, and the concomitant peak in US
coal exports. Section III presents our model. First, Section IV examines the relationship
between a unilateral CO2 reduction commitment and the increase in gas production.
Second, it assesses the effect of more gas on world CO2 emissions. Third, it draws
implications for the adjustment of climate policy in the rest of the world. The analysis
yields testable conditions establishing in which contexts the promotion of natural gas is
justified from the perspective of an individual country’s emissions objective and from a
global perspective, and the extent to which this promotion undermines the rest of the
world’s efforts to meet its own CO2 emission commitment. In Section V, we review
existing empirical estimates for the relevant parameters, and we apply our previously
4
obtained formulas to the case of the US. In Section VI, we discuss two aspects that our
analysis purposely omits: first, the fact that energy sources are actually exploited over
time and, second, the fact that gas is starting to get internationally traded.
II. An Important Example: The US Climate Strategy, the Shale Gas
Boom, and the Peak of US Coal Exports
The issue addressed in this paper is particularly well illustrated by recent developments
in the US climate policy project and in the US energy sector: namely, the rise of shale
gas, the US climate policy plan to rely on gas supply, the replacement of coal by gas in the
US power sector, and the recent peak of US coal exports. These developments, because
of their magnitude, are likely to have an impact on the world energy policy landscape.
Indeed, the US is the second top carbon emitting economy. It is also the most important
gas producer, the second top coal producer and consumer, and, last but not least, the
top coal reserve holder.
Since 2011, the US CO2 emissions have been regulated by the EPA under the Clean Air
Act Federal law. As a matter of fact, the ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement by
President Obama commits—at least for the next four years—the US Federal Government
to a 26 − 28% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2025 with respect to their 2005 level. To
meet this commitment, the previous US Administration’s plan has been to rely on the
rapid development of gas production from the shale resource in the aftermath of the
“fracking” revolution of the early 2000s. For example, in his June 25, 2013 Speech on
Climate Change, President Obama put things this way:
My administration pledged to reduce America’s greenhouse gas emissions
. . . And today, we produce more natural gas than anybody else. So we are
producing energy. And these advances have grown our economy, they have
created new jobs, they can’t be shipped overseas—and, by the way, they have
also helped drive our carbon pollution to its lowest levels in nearly twenty
years. Since 2006, no country on Earth has reduced its total carbon pollution
5
by as much as the US . . . In fact, many power companies have already begun
modernizing their plants, and creating new jobs in the process. Others have
shifted to burning cleaner natural gas instead of dirtier fuel sources . . . Today,
we use more clean energy . . . which is supporting hundreds of thousands of
good jobs. We waste less energy, which saves you money at the pump and in
your pocketbooks. And guess what—our economy is 60% bigger than it was
twenty years ago, while our carbon emissions are roughly back to where they
were twenty years ago.
Two years after this statement, the US policy project of replacing the steam coal
input by natural gas in the US power generation sector was strengthened by the proposal
of the Clean Power Plan to command this transition.5
Figure 1 shows that the replacement of coal by gas has been effective for the past few
years, and that this movement has gone hand in hand with the development of gas. It
also indicates that the policy promotion of gas has accelerated this transition in recent
years.6
Given the large CO2 impact of the US power sector, this coal-gas substitution has
indeed contributed—of course, among other factors—to the reduction of the US CO2
emissions (Feng, Davis, Sun, and Hubacek, 2015, and Kotchen and Mansur, 2016). For
example, Figure 2 shows the fall in CO2 emissions generated by energy consumption in
the US.
As President Obama emphasized in his 2015 speech, the economic success surrounding
the gas boom has entailed domestic benefits, despite the reduction in CO2 emissions that
it has induced. However, the gas boom and, therefore, its policy promotion, caused—
again, among other factors7—large amounts of coal to be released that ultimately met
5Officially, the enforcement of the plan has been temporarily halted by the Supreme Court. Mean-
while, in practice, an increasing number of States—including Republican-held ones—are taking initiatives
so as to meet the plan’s requirements.
6Figure 1 shows yearly consumption. Gas use has notoriously overtaken coal in the US power genera-
tion sector for some months in 2015 for the first time in history. See, for example, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/14/business/natural-gas-overtakes-coal-in-us-electric-generation.html.
7For example, in 2011, massive flooding in Australia prevented Australian coal to be delivered to
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Figure 1: Consumption of coal—black curve—and gas—grey curve—by the US power
generation sector in million MMBtu (Source: US Energy Information Administration)
the foreign demand for cheap energy. Figure 3 shows the peak in net US coal exports
that has been concomitant with the replacement of coal by gas in the US power sector.
The above developments are likely to persist under the recently elected US Admin-
istration. First, despite President Trump’s plan that the US not be party any longer to
the Paris agreement after 2020—and irrespective of the ultimate decision of the next US
Administration on this matter—the pressure towards a decrease in US CO2 emissions
is likely to be continued by the public actions of US states and by the self-regulation of
companies—see, for example, The Economist, June 5, 2017. Second, the rise of natural
gas will continue to be publicly supported, as confirmed by President Trump on June 29,
2017, thus accompanying the decreasing trend in US CO2 emissions.
Third, and most importantly, US coal exports are likely to continue increasing. On the
one hand, according to specialists, the ongoing replacement of coal by gas will generate
a potential for US coal exports to keep rising in the future.8 The realization of this
potential has been limited, under the Obama Administration, by the successful opposition
China, which was compensated by US coal. Besides, the US coal exports in the past few years have
served less distant markets, in South America and Europe.
8See, for example, a summary of Wolak’s simulations at http://news.stanford.edu/news/2013/
january/coal-asia-environment-011513.html. See, moreover, the most recent EIA short-run pro-
jections at https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/coal.cfm.
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Figure 2: CO2 emissions (million metric tons) from energy consumption in the US
(Source: US Energy Information Administration)
of environmental groups to the building of new coal-export terminals needed to meet
the growing coal demand in Asia.9 However, as the newly elected US Administration
notoriously supports the coal industry, it is to be anticipated that these projects will
receive a more favorable regulatory treatment. On the other hand, the rise in US coal
exports has become an objective in itself of the Trump Administration. For example, in
his recent speech at the “Unleashing American Energy Event” on June 29, 2017, President
Trump made the following announcement:
The Department of the Treasury will address barriers to the financing of
highly efficient, overseas coal energy plants. Ukraine already tells us they
need millions and millions of metric tons right now. There are many other
places that need it, too. And we want to sell it to them, and to everyone else
all over the globe who need it.
The perspective of rising US coal exports has caused growing concerns both in the
academic sphere—e.g., Meredith Fowlie’s contribution to the blog of the Energy Institute
9See, for example, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-21/
gulf-coast-embraces-u-s-coal-shippers-rejected-by-west-freight.
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Figure 3: Net exports of coal (short tons) from the US to the rest of the world (Source:
US Energy Information Administration)
at Haas, Berkeley,10 and Knittel, Metaxoglou and Trindade (2016)—and in the NGO sec-
tor, and will continue to do so under the current US administration. This paper seeks to
address these concerns. Indeed, existing studies about the coal-gas policy-induced sub-
stitution have mostly focused on the changes within the US economy—e.g., Burtraw et
al. (2014), Knittel, Metaxoglou, and Trindade (2015), and Cullen and Mansur (2017). A
recent interesting addition to this literature is due to Wolak (2016) who presents simula-
tions relating the coal-gas substitution in the US and the global coal market, assuming a
zero price-elasticity of the foreign demand for coal. According to very recent elasticity es-
timations for coal exports and imports by Knittel, Metaxoglou, Soderbery, and Trindade
(2017), the latter assumption is justified in a short-term perspective. Both studies imply
that US coal exports do not significantly contribute to increase the rest of the world’s
CO2 emissions in the short run.
There exists no theoretical analysis that integrates the US policy objective of reducing
domestic CO2 emissions, the coal-gas substitution that this objective induces, and the
resulting change in coal exports. Our findings are complementary with Wolak (2016) and
10Available at https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2014/07/28/
will-coal-exports-abroad-offset-hard-won-carbon-reductions-at-home/.
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Knittel et al. (2017) in several respects. First, they bring up theoretical insights as to
the logic of policy-induced CO2 leakage in presence of more-than-one carbon energies.
Second, they deliver testable conditions that can be applied not only to the US—as we do
in Section V—but also to any gas-rich economy that considers the option of producing
more gas to achieve its CO2 reduction commitments. Third, the application of our
formulas to the case of the US reinforces Wolak’s (2016) and Knittel et al.’s (2017)
conclusions, although, taking a longer-run perspective, we depart from the assumption
of a perfectly price-inelastic demand for coal.
III. A Simple Model of an Open Economy Using Coal and Gas
A. Basics
Regions. There are two regions. The domestic open economy of interest will be called
“Home,” and variables related to this country will accordingly be denoted by the super-
script “H.” The rest of the world will be treated as a single open economy which will be
called “Foreign,” and variables related to it will be denoted by the superscript “F.”
Coal supply. In each of the two regions, there is a price-taking representative firm
supplying coal. Coal being tradable across regions, competitive markets will establish a
single international coal price pc. The Home and Foreign coal supplying firms respectively
produce amounts sHc and s
F
c —expressed in energy units—which are determined by the
following supply functions of the coal price pc:
sHc = S
H
c (pc)
and
sFc = S
F
c (pc),
which are both assumed non negative, differentiable and strictly increasing for all pc ≥ 0.
Gas supply. For simplicity, gas is only produced in the Home country by a price-taking
representative firm, which does not export it.11 Its production sHg —expressed in energy
11In Section VI, we explain how the analysis extends to the possibility that gas be exported.
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units—is given by the supply function of the domestic price of gas pg
sHg = S
H
g (pg),
which is assumed non negative, differentiable and strictly increasing for all pg ≥ 0.
Energy demand by the Foreign country. For simplicity, the rest of the world does
only rely on the coal energy: There is a price-taking representative consumer of electric
energy in the Foreign country, and electricity is solely produced from coal through a linear
technology which, in energy units, is “one-for-one.” Therefore, the Foreign country’s coal
consumption xFc is determined by the energy demand function
12
xFc = D
F (pc),
which is assumed non negative, differentiable and strictly decreasing for all pc ≥ 0.
Energy demand by the Home country. The domestic economy relies on both coal
and gas: There is a competitive representative consumer of electric energy in the Home
country, and electricity can be produced equivalently from coal or gas through a one-
for-one energy transformation technology. Since coal and gas are perfectly substitutable,
competitive markets will establish a single final energy price, irrespective of the source of
energy. We will denote this final price by p. Therefore, the Home country’s consumption
xH of coal and gas is determined by the energy demand function
xH = DH(p),
which is assumed non negative, continuous and strictly decreasing for all p ≥ 0.13 The
domestic consumption xH corresponds to the consumption of the domestically produced
gas sHg and a residual consumption of coal x
H
c :
xH = xHc + s
H
g .
12Our model is compatible with other energies—e.g., gas or alternative energies—being produced and
consumed in the Foreign country. Indeed, the demand function DF may be interpreted as the residual
demand for coal after other locally produced energies have been consumed, with no implications on our
results.
13This demand function may be interpreted as the residual energy demand after other—e.g.,
alternative—energies have been used.
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B. Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
By assumption, the energy market is competitive. In this subsection, we assume away
any policy intervention. Public policy will be introduced in the next section.
In the sequel, as will be clear shortly below, we will focus on the empirically relevant
equilibria in which the Home economy produces electricity from coal and gas at the same
time. Since the latter are assumed perfectly substitutable, such interior equilibria are
characterized by the following no-arbitrage equality,14 relating the equilibrium domestic
final energy price to the equilibrium domestic producer prices of coal and gas:
p˜ = p˜c = p˜g; (1)
a “˜ ” on top of a variable or function will be used to indicate that this variable or function
is evaluated at the market equilibrium.
In this context, the equilibrium price p˜ is characterized by the balance between energy
demand and supply at the world level:
DH(p˜) +DF (p˜) = SHc (p˜) + S
F
c (p˜) + S
H
g (p˜), (2)
where we assume that DH(0) + DF (0) > SHc (0) + S
F
c (0) + S
H
g (0), so as to eliminate
the uninteresting situation in which there exists no equilibrium with non-zero energy
consumption. Since the left-hand side and right-hand side of (2) are respectively strictly
decreasing and increasing, p˜ > 0 is uniquely defined.
The equilibrium condition (2) may be written in the following way, highlighting the
equality between the (residual) demand for coal by the Home country, on the left-hand
14In practice, coal and gas inputs are not perfectly substitutable at the plant level because power
plants are typically fuel specific. Instead, they are substitutable at the industry level in a sufficiently-
long-term perspective that allows the building of new coal- and gas-fired power plants. That is why,
despite the fact that the US power generation sector is currently investing in new coal- and gas-fired
plants simultaneously, the equality between the price of coal and the price of gas for an equivalent
amount of power is not exactly observed. It is important to note, nevertheless, that the respective
costs of using these two fuels have been rapidly converging since 2005, whether or not other operating
expenses are integrated—see, e.g., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html.
This convergence reflects that the short-run arbitrage between the two substitutable energies tends to
vanish in the long run.
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side, and the world coal supply net of the rest of the world’s demand, on the right-hand
side:
DH(p˜)− SHg (p˜) = SHc (p˜) + SFc (p˜)−DF (p˜). (3)
We make the following assumption:
DH(p˜) > SHg (p˜) > 0, (4)
which implies that there exists a non-zero residual demand DH(p˜)− SHg (p˜) > 0 for coal
in the Home country in the equilibrium. Assumption (4) formally validates our earlier-
mentioned focus on situations in which coal and gas are used simultaneously in the Home
country.
The equilibrium price of energy p˜ defined by (2) determines all other variables: do-
mestic gas production s˜Hg = S
H
g (p˜); domestic and foreign coal production s˜
H
c = S
H
c (p˜)
and s˜Fc = S
F
c (p˜); domestic electricity consumption from coal and gas x˜
H = DH(p˜), and,
therefore, domestic coal consumption x˜Hc = x˜
H − s˜Hg ; rest-of-the-world coal consumption
x˜Fc = D
F (p˜).
It follows that the equilibrium also determines the Home country’s net exports of coal,
on the left-hand side, which meet the Foreign country’s net imports, on the right-hand
side:
s˜Hc −
(
x˜H − s˜Hg
)
= s˜Fc − x˜Fc ; (5)
net exports or imports may be positive or negative, with no consequence on our qualitative
results.
IV. Domestic CO2 Reduction and Gas Promotion
In this section, we examine a policy aiming to reduce the CO2 emissions that are generated
by the use of coal and gas in the Home country.
A. CO2 Emissions
We assume that, per unit of energy, coal consumption and gas consumption generate
respectively θc and θg units of CO2. We further assume that coal is more CO2 intensive
13
than gas:
θc ≥ θg > 0.
Therefore, domestic CO2 emissions amount to
eH = θcx
H
c + θgs
H
g . (6)
B. Domestic CO2 Commitment and Implementation
Assume now that the Home country is committed to limit its CO2 emissions eH , so that
it remains below the exogenous cap e¯H :
θcx
H
c + θgs
H
g ≤ e¯H . (7)
However this commitment is implemented, it necessarily translates into a penalty
for using CO2 that augments the market price of coal and gas, whether this penalty is
explicit or implicit.15 Consider, for simplicity, that this penalty is explicit: For example,
(7) is implemented by a carbon tax or by a competitive market for emission rights,
giving rise, in either case, to an explicit CO2 price, which we denote by the variable
τH ≥ 0. In equilibrium, this variable is endogenously determined in such a way that the
emission commitment is met. If the implementation system is a carbon tax, the domestic
government establishes the tax level τ˜H so that (7) is satisfied. If there is a tradable
permit system, τ˜H is the equilibrium price of a right to emit one CO2 unit out of the
quota e¯H . Obviously, if the cap e¯H is soft in the sense that it falls short of equilibrium
emissions θcx˜
H
c + θg s˜
H
g realized in absence of policy, as described in the previous section,
then τ˜H = 0, and the analysis of the previous section applies; otherwise, the cap is strong,
constraint (7) will be active and τ˜H > 0.
In turn, the CO2 price τH amounts to varying taxes on coal and gas, proportional
to their CO2 intensity. That is, under the commitment (7), the additional cost of using
coal is θcτ
H and the additional cost of using gas is θgτ
H . Therefore, the user prices of
15In practice, for example in the US, regulatory standards are often used, imposing tighter constraints
to the biggest sources of CO2 emissions.
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coal and gas in the Home country become respectively pc + θcτ
H and pg + θgτ
H and
the no-arbitrage condition (1) which must prevail in equilibrium should be adjusted as
follows:
p˜ = p˜c + θcτ˜
H = p˜g + θg τ˜
H . (8)
This condition relates the equilibrium producer prices for coal p˜c and gas p˜g to the
equilibrium domestic price for energy p˜ and the equilibrium domestic price of CO2, τ˜H .
Therefore, the former producer prices are given by
p˜c = p˜− θcτ˜H (9)
and
p˜g = p˜− θg τ˜H . (10)
Like in Section III, equilibrium prices must balance supply and demand on the world
energy market; using expressions (9) and (10), the equilibrium condition (2) becomes
DH(p˜) +DF (p˜− θcτ˜H) = SHc (p˜− θcτ˜H) + SFc (p˜− θcτ˜H) + SHg (p˜− θg τ˜H). (11)
Equilibrium prices must further satisfy the binding commitment (7):
θc
[
DH(p˜)− SHg (p˜− θg τ˜H)
]
+ θgS
H
g (p˜− θg τ˜H) = e¯H . (12)
It can be verified that the unique solution (p˜, τ˜H) of the system (11)-(12) determines
producer prices p˜c and p˜g by (9) and (10), and, therefore, all equilibrium quantities. In
particular, the equilibrium domestic gas production
s˜Hg = S
H
g (p˜g) = S
H
g (p˜− θg τ˜H)
will be examined in the next subsection.
C. Effect of Domestic CO2 Reduction on Domestic Gas Production
We now turn to the effects of a reduction in the domestic CO2 cap e¯H . In this subsection,
we focus on the reaction of the domestic production of gas; the effect on world CO2
emissions will be examined thereafter.
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For simplicity, we consider an infinitesimal change de¯H < 0, starting from the equilib-
rium level of emissions θcx˜
H
c +θg s˜
H
g in absence of emission commitment, as in the previous
section. That means that, by assumption, prior to the change in e¯H , the constraint (7)
is not active so that τ˜H = 0 and the equilibrium is the one characterized in Section III.
Intuition suggests—and Appendix A confirms—that the change de¯H < 0 causes τ˜H
to become strictly positive, thus introducing penalties on both coal and gas used in
the Home country. Accordingly, the domestic final price of energy p˜ increases, so that
domestic energy consumption x˜H decreases, as expected.
According to (9) and (10), it follows that the producer prices p˜c and p˜g for coal and
gas are each affected in two opposite directions: On the one hand, they are pushed
upwards by the rise in the final energy price p˜, and, on the other hand, they are impacted
negatively by the increase in the carbon penalty τ˜H , to the extent of their respective CO2
intensities θc ≥ θg. As far as coal is concerned, Appendix A verifies that the reduction in
the domestic emission cap systematically induces the producer price p˜c to decrease, thus
reducing coal production s˜Hc ; this intuitive reaction is the same as in standard models
with a single polluting energy.
As far as gas is concerned, things are not so simple. Gas is polluting, but less so
than coal. For such an intermediate energy, the rise in the final energy price p˜ may more
than compensate the increase in the carbon penalty τ˜H , so that the producer price of gas
p˜g = p˜ − θg τ˜H and, therefore, domestic gas production s˜Hg = Sg(p˜g), may increase as a
result of the emission cap reduction de¯H < 0.
In Appendix A, the analysis of the total differentiation of (11)-(12) with respect to
e¯H , τ˜H and p˜ shows the following result.
Proposition 1 (Effect of domestic CO2 reduction on gas production) A reduc-
tion of CO2 emissions in the Home country warrants a higher production of gas if and
only if
θc − θg
θg
> r˜0 ≡
ξ˜DH
x˜Fc
x˜H
ξ˜DF +
s˜c
x˜H
ξ˜Sc
. (13)
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We have used the following notations: ξDH ≡ −DH′(p)p/xH > 0 is the price elasticity
of the domestic energy demand, ξDF ≡ −DF ′(pc)pc/xF > 0, the price elasticity of coal
demand in the rest of the world, and ξSc ≡ S ′c(pc)pc/sc > 0 the price elasticity of the
world coal supply, where sc = Sc(pc) ≡ SHc (pc) + SFc (pc) is the world supply of coal.
Proposition 1 provides a testable condition according to which the reduction of do-
mestic emissions in a gas-producing country justifies that more gas be produced. This
condition relates, on the one hand, the rate of increase in pollution (θc− θg)/θg ≥ 0 from
gas to coal with, on the other hand, demand and supply price elasticities and market
shares evaluated in equilibrium.
For any observed elasticities and market shares, the proposition tells that more gas
should be produced when coal is sufficiently more CO2 intensive than gas. For example, in
the limit case in which gas would tend to be CO2 free (θg 7→ 0), the left-hand side of (13)
would tend to be infinitely high, so that the condition would be systematically satisfied.
Indeed, in the standard model in which only one of two perfectly substitutable energy
sources is polluting, the reduction of pollution commands to increase the production
of the non-carbon substitute. Also for example, if coal and gas were equally polluting
(θc − θg = 0), the fact that the right-hand side of (13) is non negative implies that the
condition would never be satisfied. Indeed, in this limit case, there would be a single
homogeneously polluting energy source with no substitute, requiring that its production
be reduced to decrease pollution.
However, for sensible values of CO2 intensities θc and θg, whether condition (13) is
satisfied and, therefore, gas production should be increased depends on the properties
of the emission-reducing open economy, which are reflected in the right-hand side r˜0 of
the condition. The analysis of this term indicates that relying on gas to reduce CO2
emissions is most likely to be justified if x˜H is low, if x˜Fc and s˜c are high, and if ξ˜Sc is
low, that is, for small energy-consuming open economies, in a world in which coal has
a large market share, especially in the rest of the world, and in which the price of coal
will have little impact on coal supply. Therefore, this formula may be satisfied for some
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gas-producing countries and not for others, implying different policy recommendations
about the promotion of gas.
For example, in Section V, we will examine how Proposition 1 applies to the case of
the US.
D. Effect of Domestic CO2 Reduction on Coal Exports and World Emissions
We now examine the impact of reducing the domestic CO2 cap e¯H on world CO2 emis-
sions. In our model, total CO2 emissions eW not only consist of the domestic emissions
eH defined in (6), but also of emissions eF released by the rest of the world:
eW = eH + eF . (14)
By assumption, the former are set to the binding limit e˜H = e¯H as per (7) and are,
therefore, reduced accordingly. At the same time, the Foreign country’s use of coal
releases equilibrium CO2 emissions
e˜F = θcx˜
F
c , (15)
where x˜Fc = D
F (p˜c).
Were the foreign coal demand DF perfectly price inelastic, as it might be in the
short run, the rest of the world’s CO2 emissions would never increase.16 In a medium-
to long-term perspective over which coal demand becomes elastic, however, emissions
e˜F are systematically increased as a result of the domestic CO2 reduction.17 In this
context, as mentioned above—and shown in Appendix A—the domestic CO2 reduction
policy necessarily reduces the producer price p˜c of the most carbon intensive coal energy,
inducing a rise in the equilibrium use of coal x˜Fc in the rest of the world. This is so despite
the fact that the decreased coal producer price p˜c induces a reduction in coal production
16For example, this is the assumption that Wolak (2016) makes and that Knittel et al.’s (2017) short-
run estimation supports.
17Although coal demand in the Foreign country can be interpreted as the residual demand for coal
after some other local energies have been used, our simplifying formulation implies that CO2 emissions
from these other energies are omitted, as if they were all non-carbon energies. Taking into account the
CO2 emissions generated by other carbon energies in the Foreign country would slightly modify the
model, with no implications on our qualitative results.
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s˜Hc and s˜
F
c in both regions. This is the effect highlighted by the standard leakage analysis
focusing on a single carbon energy source. It follows that the net coal imports s˜Fc − x˜Fc of
the Foreign country, and, by (5), the net coal exports of the Home country in direction
of the rest of the world, increase systematically as a result of the domestic CO2 emission
reduction. This stresses the central role of the latter, identified in Section II in the case
of the US.
Therefore, the policy-induced reduction in domestic CO2 emissions is, at least partly,
compensated by the increase in emissions in the rest of the world due to increased domestic
coal exports. In fact, our next result indicates that this compensation may more than
offset the domestic CO2 reduction, ultimately causing world CO2 emissions to rise. In
other words, unlike the standard leakage analysis with a single carbon energy source, the
rate of CO2 leakage associated with the domestic CO2 reduction—see Appendix B for
details—
de˜F
de¯H
=
[
ξ˜
DH
x˜H
ξ˜Sg s˜
H
g
(
θc−θg
θg
+ 1
)
+ θc−θg
θg
] (
θc−θg
θg
+ 1
)
ξ˜
DH
x˜H
ξ˜
DF
x˜Fc
+
[(
θc−θg
θg
)2
+
(
θc−θg
θg
+ 1
)2
ξ˜
DH
x˜H
ξ˜Sg s˜
H
g
](
ξ˜Sc s˜c
ξ˜
DF
x˜Fc
+ 1
) (16)
may exceed 100%. Accordingly, in this subsection, we address the question of the ef-
fectiveness of the domestic unilateral CO2 reduction policy: Under which circumstances
does this policy remain less than compensated by the concomitant increase in emissions
in the rest of the world? In other words, under which circumstances does the emission
leakage rate remain less than 100%?
In Appendix B, the analysis of the total differentiation of world emissions e˜W = e¯H+e˜F
and of the leakage rate (16) with respect to e¯H shows the following result.
Proposition 2 (Leakage from domestic CO2 reduction and effect on world CO2)
A reduction of CO2 emissions in the Home country effectively contributes to reduce world
CO2 emissions—i.e., the leakage rate is less than 100%—if and only if
θc − θg
θg
<
ξ˜DH
x˜Fc
x˜H
ξ˜DF +
s˜c
x˜H
ξ˜Sc

1 + (θc − θg
θg
+ 1
)
ξ˜Sc

 θc−θgθg + 1
s˜Hg
s˜c
ξ˜Sg
+
θc−θg
θg
x˜H
s˜c
ξ˜DH



. (17)
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Proposition 2 provides a testable condition according to which the reduction of do-
mestic emissions in a gas-producing country effectively contributes to reduce world emis-
sions. Like (13), condition (17) relates, on the one hand, the rate of increase in pollution
(θc − θg)/θg ≥ 0 from gas to coal with, on the other hand, demand and supply price
elasticities and market shares.
Comparing (17) with (13), one can immediately see that their left-hand sides are
identical, equal to the rate of increase in pollution from gas to coal. The comparison
further reveals that the first fraction on their right-hand sides are similar, equal to r˜0
as defined in (13). Moreover, by definition of the elasticity variables, the term between
brackets on the right-hand side of (17) happens to be more than one—rather than equal
to one in (13).
Condition (17), therefore, can only be violated if condition (13) is satisfied: It means
that the domestic CO2 reduction policy may only be counter-productive—and the leakage
rate be more than 100%—if it is accompanied by a development of gas as per Proposition
1. In particular, in the extreme situation in which coal supply is perfectly inelastic, as
when ξ˜Sc = 0, the right-hand sides of (17) and (13) become identical to each other, so
that the two conditions are complementary. In this example, obviously, a domestic CO2
reduction policy accompanied by a development of gas does not induce a reduction of
coal use at all, thus systematically leading to a more-than-100% leakage rate. Otherwise,
when the domestic CO2 reduction justifies to limit both coal and gas use in the Home
country, world emissions will never increase.
Unlike condition (13), the rate of pollution increase from gas to coal (θc− θg)/θg is in
general not only involved in the left-hand side of (13) but also in its right-hand side. For
any observed equilibrium elasticities and market shares, for which values (θc − θg)/θg is
inequality (17) satisfied, the leakage rate (16) less than 100%, and, therefore, the domestic
CO2 reduction policy effective? To start with, we examine the two limit cases. First, one
can easily verify that if gas tended to be CO2 free (θg 7→ 0), the right-hand side of (17)
would tend to infinity more rapidly than its left-hand side. In this case, therefore, the
20
condition would always be satisfied so that the domestic CO2 reduction would always
lead to less CO2 at the world level, like in the standard model in which only one energy
source is polluting. Second, if gas and coal were equally CO2 intensive (θc − θg = 0),
the left-hand side would be zero and would always be strictly less than the right-hand
non-negative side. Therefore, in this case, the condition would also be systematically
satisfied so that the domestic reduction policy would be effective, like in the standard
model in which there is a homogenous carbon energy source.
For intermediate values of the rate of pollution increase from gas to coal, nevertheless,
the domestic CO2 reduction may be more than compensated by a more-than-100% leakage
rate. More precisely, Appendix B shows that condition (17) is satisfied if and only if the
function of r = (θc − θg)/θg
P (r) = S ′c(p˜c)
(
1− D
H′(p˜)
SH′g (p˜g)
)
r2+
(
DF ′(p˜c)−
S ′c(p˜c)D
H′(p˜)
SH′g (p˜g)
)
r−DH′(p˜)
(
1 +
S ′c(p˜c)
SH′g (p˜g)
)
(18)
is strictly positive. This function is a polynomial of degree two, which is represented by
the U-shaped curve of Figure 4. Its analysis in Appendix B yields the following corollary
of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 (Counter-productive domestic CO2 reduction) A reduction of CO2
emissions in the Home country induces a rise in world CO2 emissions—i.e., the leakage
rate is more than 100%—
1. Only if
(
x˜Fc
x˜H
ξ˜DF
)2
− 4
(
s˜c
x˜H
ξ˜Sc +
s˜Hg
x˜H
ξ˜Sg +
x˜F
x˜H
ξ˜DF + ξ˜DH
)
ξ˜DH ξ˜Sc
ξ˜Sg
s˜c
s˜g
> 0, (19)
which guarantees that function P (r) in (18) admits two real roots r˜ < ˜¯r;
2. And, provided that (19) is satisfied, if and only if,
r˜ <
θc − θg
θg
< ˜¯r. (20)
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Corollary 1 helps summarize the conditions under which the domestic CO2 reduction
policy happens to be counter-productive.
E. Summary
Assuming that condition (19) is satisfied, Corollary 1 tells that the domestic CO2 reduc-
tion policy turns out to be counter-productive when the rate of pollution increase from
gas to coal (θc − θg)/θg takes intermediate values, in between the two thresholds r˜ and ˜¯r
represented in Figure 4. At the same time, the analysis of Proposition 2 already revealed
that the domestic policy may only be counter-productive when the policy warrants the
production of more gas, implying that r˜0 ≤ r˜.
θc−θg
θg
Less Gas
0
More Gas
Less CO2 Less CO2More CO2
r˜0 r˜ ˜¯r
Figure 4: Domestic CO2 reduction policy, occurrence of gas boom and increase in world
CO2 emissions
To sum up, for low values (θc − θg)/θg ≤ r˜0, as when coal and gas are not so different
as far their CO2 intensity is concerned, the domestic CO2 reduction objective does not
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call for a rise in gas production. For sufficiently high values r˜0 < (θc − θg)/θg, as when
gas is significantly less CO2 intensive than coal, the domestic CO2 reduction policy does
warrant that more gas be produced. Despite the fact that the promotion of gas induces
more coal to be exported from the Home country to the rest of the world, this does not
necessarily mean that world emissions are increased. In fact, only for intermediate values
r˜0 ≤ r˜ < (θc − θg)/θg < ˜¯r, if any, the domestic policy is counter-productive, inducing
ultimately more CO2 emissions at the world level. For ˜¯r ≤ (θc−θg)/θg, as when gas has a
sufficiently low carbon intensity, the policy does command more gas to be produced and
more coal to be exported, yet ultimately contributing to reduce world CO2 emissions.
Last but not least, these various possibilities do not only depend on the rate of pollu-
tion increase (θc − θg)/θg, but also on the values of the thresholds r˜0, r˜ and ˜¯r, which all
reflect the observed equilibrium characteristics of the gas-rich Home country committed
to reduce its CO2 emissions. This motivates, for example, the application of Section V
to the case of the US.
F. CO2 Commitment and Implementation in the Rest of the World
We have hitherto considered that the rest of the world was not committed to any CO2
limitation when examining the domestic CO2 reduction policy. In that case, we have
established the conditions under which this policy increases excessively the emissions of
the Foreign country so that it may become counter-productive at the world level. In fact,
in the aftermath of the Paris agreement, it is interesting to examine the case in which
the rest of the world is also committed to a CO2 emission cap. That is what we do in
this subsection: We assume that the Foreign country’s CO2 emissions are limited to the
exogenous level e¯F . With our simplifying assumption that the Foreign country only relies
on the coal energy, that means
θcx˜
F
c = e¯
F . (21)
In a way similar to the Home country, consider that this limitation is implemented
by means of an explicit carbon price τ˜F > 0, whether it is a carbon tax or the price
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of carbon permits. It implies a carbon penalty θcτ
F on the Foreign country’s use of
coal. Accordingly, the coal consumer price in the rest of the world should be adjusted to
become, instead of p˜c = p˜− θcτ˜H as per equation (9),
p˜c = p˜− θcτ˜H + θcτ˜F , (22)
where, following our previous formulation, p˜−θcτ˜H remains the international price of the
coal energy. Consequently, the world energy balance condition (11) should be adjusted
to become
DH(p˜) +DF
(
p˜− θcτ˜H + θcτ˜F
)
= SHc (p˜− θcτ˜H) + SFc (p˜− θcτ˜H) + SHg (p˜− θg τ˜H). (23)
In the context of this subsection, compared with the previous setting in absence of CO2
emission cap in the rest of the world, equilibrium prices p˜, τ˜H and τ˜F are determined so
as to satisfy the new world energy market equilibrium condition (23), the Home country’s
commitment (12), as well as the new Foreign country’s commitment
θcD
F (p˜− θcτ˜H + θcτ˜F ) = e¯F . (24)
In this new setting, Appendix C shows that the domestic CO2 reduction policy still
induces a lower coal price p˜c and more coal exports s˜
H
c − x˜Hc from the Home country
to the rest of the world. Although, by assumption, CO2 emissions in the latter are not
increased, the carbon equilibrium penalty τ˜F should be raised to ensure that the cap (21)
is satisfied: It means that the domestic CO2 reduction policy makes it more difficult for
the rest of the world to meet its own commitment.
The following proposition—proved in Appendix C—establishes the extent to which
the rest of the world should increase its carbon price in response to the domestic CO2
reduction policy, so as to meet its emission limit e¯F .
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Proposition 3 (Domestic CO2 reduction and policy in the rest of the world)
In the face of a reduction of CO2 emissions in the Home country, satisfying the Foreign
country’s CO2 commitment requires that the latter raises its carbon penalty relatively to
the Home country’s one to an extent given by
dτ˜F
dτ˜H
=
ξ˜DH +
(
θc−θg
θc
)
x˜Hg
x˜H
ξ˜Sg
ξ˜DH +
s˜c
x˜H
ξ˜Sc +
x˜Hg
x˜H
ξ˜Sg
. (25)
Interestingly, expression (25) of the relative carbon-price rise in the rest of the world
is increasing with the rate θc−θg
θc
, all other things being equal. This suggests that, in
reaction to the domestic CO2 reduction policy, the rest of the world should increase its
carbon penalty even more when gas is less CO2 intensive relative to coal.
V. Numerical Application to the US
Section II stressed the relevance of the US example by documenting the following devel-
opments: The boom of gas production in the US has supported the recent decrease in US
CO2 emissions, and has been concomitant with a peak in coal exports. The predictions
of our model are in line with these developments.
In this section, we apply the theoretical results of Section IV to the case of the US:
Do our results justify the promotion of gas in the US as a means to reduce domestic
CO2 emissions? Does this strategy effectively contribute to reduce CO2 emissions at the
world level? To what extent does this strategy make the rest of world’s CO2 emission
commitment difficult to achieve?
For this application, we use sensible approximations of market shares, as well as
empirical estimates collected from the existing literature on energy demand and supply
elasticities.
A. Empirical Estimates of Parameters and Equilibrium Values
Coal and gas relative CO2 intensity. Following the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC, 2014, Annex 3, Table A.3.2), the relative CO2 pollution intensity
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of coal is approximately θc/θg = 2, implying that the rate in pollution increase from gas to
coal is (θc− θg)/θg = 1. Although the use of this ratio is standard, it is also controversial
for mainly two reasons. One is the heterogeneity of the coal resource as far as its carbon
content is concerned. Another one, already mentioned in the Introduction, is that gas
does not only contribute to climate change by releasing CO2 when burnt but also by
potentially releasing methane when extracted—see, e.g., Howarth et al. (2011). To take
this controversy into account, we will examine how our application is sensitive to changes
in (θc − θg)/θg.
Market shares. Data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)18 suggest
the following approximation: Were the current world production/consumption of coal and
the US gas production/consumption normalized to s˜c + s˜
H
g = 8 units of energy, it would
be decomposed as s˜c = 7 units of coal production, s˜
H
g = 1 unit of US gas production, and
x˜H = 2 units of US energy consumption. It follows that x˜Fc = 6 units of the s˜c = 7 units
of world coal production would be consumed in the rest of the world, while the US coal
consumption would be of x˜Hc = 1 unit. Also, the US energy consumption x˜
H = 2 would
consist of about x˜Hc = 1 unit of coal consumption and x˜
H
g = 1 unit of gas consumption.
US electricity demand price elasticity. Various studies estimate the price elasticity
of the demand for electricity in the US. Maddala et al. (1997) focus on the residential
demand; their average estimates across 49 US States are 0.16 and 0.24 for the short
and long run respectively. These orders of magnitude are confirmed by Garcia-Cerrutti
(2000), and Bernstein and Griffin (2006). The former studies the residential sector in
Californian counties and finds mean elasticity estimates of 0.17 for the short run and 0.19
for the lung run. The latter find 0.24 and 0.32 for the short and long run respectively.
For the US commercial sector, Paul et al. (2009) find average price elasticities of the
electricity demand of 0.11 and 0.29 in the short and long run. In the industrial sector,
their estimates are 0.16 in the short run and 0.4 in the long run. Recently, Deryugina et
18The data used here are available at https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.php#consumption
and https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/coal.php.
26
al. (2017) find the one-year average price elasticity to be 0.14 and the three-year price
elasticity to be 0.29 in the residential and small commercial sector.
For their recent simulation, Chakravorty et al. (2015) assume a 0.3 price elasticity of
the US final demand for energy, which is in line with the above long-run estimates.
In our model, price elasticities are medium-run responses, i.e., evaluated over periods
of time that allow the replacement of coal-fired power stations by gas-fired ones. In reality,
the elasticity of the demand for coal and gas induced by the demand for the electricity
produced from these energies may differ from the elasticity of the final electricity demand
because there are other, alternative ways of producing electricity. However, alternative
sources play a minor role in electricity generation.
Therefore, our numerical application will assume the intermediate value of 0.2 for the
price elasticity ξ˜DH of the US demand of coal and gas for electricity generation purposes.
Non-US coal demand price elasticity. The non-US demand for coal—especially in
the top coal-consuming Chinese economy—is often considered to be very inelastic in the
short run. This assumption has been recently questioned by Burke and Liao (2015). They
estimate the price elasticity of the demand for coal in China using a panel of province-
level data over the 1998-2012 period. They find a range 0.3 to 0.7 when responses are
considered over a two years period of time.
For their simulation, Chakravorty et al. (2015) assume a price elasticity of the energy
demand of 0.4 for the industrial sector and of 0.5 for the commercial and residential
sectors.
Accordingly, our numerical application will assume the intermediate value of 0.5 for
the price elasticity ξ˜DF of the demand for coal in the rest of the world.
Coal and gas supply price elasticity. The price elasticity of fossil fuels’ supply
is usually low, even in the long run; it reflects the scarcity of economically exploitable
resources. As far as natural gas is concerned, Brown and Krupnick’s (2010) estimates of
the long-run price elasticity of supply range from 0.9 to 1.4. The empirical literature on
the price elasticity of coal supply is characterized by a large variety of estimates, ranging
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from 0.1 to 7.9—see, e.g., Labys et al. (1979), Beck et al. (1991), Dahl and Duggan
(1996), Light (1999), Light et al. (1999), and Truby and Paulus (2012).
In our numerical application, we proceed in two basic steps. First, we assume the
sensible, but arbitrary, value of 1 for both the price elasticity ξ˜Sc of coal supply and the
price elasticity ξ˜Sg of gas supply. Second, we examine how our results are sensitive to
changes in these two elasticities.
B. Application Results and Sensitivity Analyses
CO2 reduction policy in the US and domestic gas production. According to
Proposition 1, condition (13) tells whether the Home country CO2 reduction commitment
justifies a rise in gas production. In the case of the US, the values given by the previous
subsection yields r˜0 = 0.04 for left-hand-side threshold of condition (13), which largely
falls short of the value of 1 for the rate of pollution increase (θc−θg)/θg. This application
of Proposition 1, therefore, suggests that a reduction of CO2 emissions in the US does
warrant that this reduction be met by increasing the US production of gas.
CO2 reduction policy in the US and world CO2 emissions. Proposition 2 and
its analysis point out that a rise in US gas induced by a reduction of CO2 emissions in the
US may be accompanied by a more-than-100% leakage rate causing an ultimate increase
in world CO2 emissions.
With the above chosen values, however, we find that the value in (19) is negative,
implying by Corollary 1 that a US CO2 reduction reached by means of a domestic rise in
gas cannot induce world CO2 emissions to increase, irrespective of the rate (θc − θg)/θc
of pollution increase from gas to coal. That means that, in the case of the US with our
chosen values, function (18) has no real roots, so that, in Figure 4, the U-shaped curve
lies above the horizontal axis. Accordingly, the associated leakage rate as expressed in
(16) takes the value of
de˜F
de¯H
= 41%.
This number, although relatively high, significantly falls short of the 100% counter-
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effectiveness threshold. This result, nevertheless, happens to change dramatically when
other values of supply elasticities are considered.
Variations in supply price elasticities. The leakage rate of 41% just obtained is
highly sensitive to small changes in the price elasticities ξ˜Sc and ξ˜Sg of coal and gas supply.
This is illustrated by the iso-leakage-rate curves of Figure 5 in the coal- and gas-supply
elasticities’ space. In particular, Figure 5 shows that the leakage rate may exceed 100%
for elasticity values that fall into the range of values that are admitted by the empirical
literature, as, for example, with ξ˜Sc = 0.1 and ξ˜Sg = 1.
Figure 5: Curves of iso-leakage-rate and supply elasticities
Variations in relative CO2 intensities. By contrast, Figure 6 shows that sen-
sible changes in the rate of pollution increase (θc − θg)/θg around the standard—but
controversial—value of 1 does not modify significantly the rate of leakage. For example,
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the leakage rate is maximum at 42% when coal is 62% more polluting than gas.
Figure 6: Leakage rate and the rate of increase of pollution from gas to coal
At the same time, Figure 6 shows that the often-made simplifying assumption of a
single polluting energy may lead to importantly underestimate the leakage rate. For
example, if gas were as polluting as coal—i.e., (θc − θg)/θg = 0—as if there were no
intermediate energy, the obtained leakage rate would be of 27%, rather than 41%.
CO2 reduction policy in the US and policy in the rest of the world. According
to Proposition 3, formula (25) indicates the relative carbon penalty increase that the rest
of the world must implement to ensure that its CO2 commitment remains satisfied in the
face of the domestic CO2 reduction. With the values chosen in the previous subsection,
the application of this formula tells us that, were the US policy raising the US price of
carbon by $10, the rest of the world should react by raising its carbon price by $1.7.
With a single resource (θg = θc)—as when the presence of gas as an intermediate energy
is ignored—the same increase in the US price of carbon would be offset by a rise in
rest-of-the-world carbon price by only $0.48.
30
VI. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis stresses that, with an intermediate carbon energy source like gas, a well-
intentioned unilateral CO2 reduction policy may be more than offset by a more-than-
100% leakage rate, making the policy counter-productive at the world level. This sharply
contrasts with the standard analysis of unilateral policies with a single carbon energy
source, in which the leakage rate is always less than 100%. In this new context, an
examination was needed of the circumstances under which a unilateral policy relying on
gas turns counter-productive. We have established simple and testable conditions (ı)
under which a domestic CO2 reduction warrants that gas production be increased and
(ıı) under which such an increase effectively helps reduce CO2 emissions at the world
level.
Our results look simple. However, they are new and they shed light on a currently
important policy option. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Paris Climate Agreement,
countries will rely on unilateral initiatives to meet their CO2 reduction targets, and, in
this context, a number of large gas-rich economies hope to do so by increasing their gas
production.
Our formulas can be applied to any such gas-rich region to help evaluate whether the
option of relying on gas effectively contributes to reducing CO2 emissions at the world
level. For example, our application to the most important US case suggests that the rise
of gas in the US is not only warranted from the perspective of the national current CO2
commitment, but also from the perspective of a need to reduce CO2 emissions at the world
level. This finding confirms and consolidates the conclusion of Wolak (2016) and Knittel
et al. (2017), obtained under the extreme assumption that the foreign demand for coal
is perfectly inelastic. At the same time, our application identifies the central role of coal-
and gas-supply elasticities, which highly affect the impact of the US policy; therefore, it
calls for further empirical research to estimate more precisely these elasticities.
For this analysis, we have purposely used a highly stylized setting, focusing on the
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aspects that seemed to be the most fundamental ones: an open-economy relying on
carbon-generating coal and gas, using its gas domestically and trading coal with the rest
of the world. Consequently, our results have been obtained under simplifying conditions
and one may question whether they survive more complex settings. As already explained
in the main text, the extension of the model to the case in which other energies can be used
to produce electricity—including foreign gas in the rest of the world—is straightforward
once energy demand functions are reinterpreted as residual demands after other energies
have been used. Two other aspects are omitted in our analysis, however, which deserve
further discussion.
A. Dynamic Coal and Gas Supplies
First, coal and gas energy sources are fossil fuels that are produced over time. One ex-
tension of our analysis to the case in which coal and gas supply is dynamic is straightfor-
ward. Assume that both energy sources are costlessly produced over some time horizon by
Hotelling-style (Hotelling, 1931) competitive sectors seeking to maximize long-term prof-
its. Consider that these sectors develop exploitable reserves prior to extracting them at
some convex exploration and development costs, in the manner first proposed by Gaudet
and Lasserre (1988). In this case, it can easily be verified that the formulation of the
model in terms of cumulative quantities over the time horizon is isomorphic to the static
model of Sections III and IV; the analysis of a reduction in long-term total emissions in
the Home country yields the same results as Propositions 1, 2 and 3, and Corollary 1.
The formulas would only differ by the notion of supply elasticities involved, which would
emerge as elasticities of the long-run production of reserves, rather than static supply
elasticities; this difference highlights that the elasticity notion that is relevant for our
analysis should reflect sufficiently long-run supply responses.
B. International Gas Trade
The second aspect that needs to be discussed is the possibility that natural gas be traded.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the international trade of gas is highly challenging
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in comparison with coal. However, the former is progressively becoming reality. For
example, following a wave of investment in Liquefied Natural Gas export terminals, the
US has shipped natural gas since February last year.
In fact, our analysis extends in a relatively straightforward way to the possibility that
the rest of the world may import some gas produced in the Home country. There are two
basic cases.
First, assume that coal and gas are perfectly substitutable not only in the Home
country but also in the Foreign region. There are two possibilities. If coal and gas
are used simultaneously in the Home country, as in our main analysis, the no-arbitrage
condition p˜c + θcτ˜
H = p˜g + θg τ˜
H prevails as per (8), and implies that p˜c < p˜g: In this
case, no gas will ultimately be used in the rest of the world and the analysis of the
main text applies. If instead coal and gas are used simultaneously in the rest of the
world, the counterpart of (8) for the Foreign country p˜c = p˜g must hold, contradicting
(8): p˜c + θcτ˜
H > p˜g + θg τ˜
H : In this case, no coal is used in the Home country, and the
analysis reduces to the standard leakage model in which a unilateral CO2 reduction never
increases world CO2 emissions.
Second, assume that coal and gas are imperfect substitutes in the rest of the world. For
simplicity, consider that there is an independent demand for gas DFg (pg) in the Foreign
country. This allows gas to be used at the same time as coal not only in the Home
country but also in the rest of world. In this case, our analysis survives, provided that
the domestic supply of gas is reinterpreted as a residual supply, after the rest-of-the-world
demand has been served.
To conclude, whether it is internationally traded or not, a carbon intermediate energy
source like gas, used at the same time as another more carbon intensive energy source like
coal, retains its central role which modifies both the qualitative and quantitative analysis
of unilateral climate policies and international leakage.
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APPENDICES
A Proof of Proposition 1
In order to alleviate notations, variables’ functions will be omitted throughout the fol-
lowing appendices, as long as it does not cause ambiguity.
Final energy price and domestic C02 price
Totally differentiating the system (11)-(12) with respect to e¯H , p˜ and τ˜H yields two
linear equations which can be written as the following matrix equation:(
A1 A2
A3 A4
)(
dp˜
dτ˜H
)
=
(
0
1
)
de¯H ,
where, using the simplifying notation Sc ≡ SHc + SFc ,
A1 = D
H′ +DF ′ − (S ′c + SH′g ) < 0,
A2 = −θcDF ′ + θcS ′c + θgSH′g > 0,
A3 = θcD
H′ − (θc − θg)SH′g < 0,
A4 = θg(θc − θg)SH′g > 0.
(A.1)
The signs of terms A1, A2, A3 and A4 follow from our assumptions.
Inverting the matrix, one obtains(
dp˜
dτ˜H
)
=
1
A1A4 − A2A3
(
A4 −A2
−A3 A1
)(
0
1
)
de¯H
or, equivalently, (
dp˜
de¯H
dτ˜H
de¯H
)
=
1
A1A4 − A2A3
(−A2
A1
)
. (A.2)
By (A.1), A1 < 0, −A2 < 0, while A1A4 − A2A3 can easily be reduced as follows and,
therefore, shown to be positive:
A1A4 −A2A3 = −θ2gDH′SH′g + (θc − θg)2 SH′g
(
S ′c −DF ′
)
− θ2cDH′
(
S ′c −DF ′
)
> 0. (A.3)
One can conclude
dp˜
de¯H
< 0 and
dτ˜H
de¯H
< 0. (A.4)
Coal price on the international market
By (9), the equilibrium coal price is p˜c = p˜− θcτ˜H . Differentiating this equation with
respect to e¯H and using (A.2), one obtains:
dp˜c
de¯H
= − 1
A1A4 −A2A3
(A2 + θcA1) ,
where A1A4 − A2A3 > 0 by (A.3), and where, by (A.1), A2 + θcA1 can easily be shown
to be negative:
A2 + θcA1 = θcD
H′ − (θc − θg)SH′g < 0.
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One can conclude
dp˜c
de¯H
> 0. (A.5)
Home country energy consumption and coal and gas supplies
The equilibrium energy consumption in the Home country is x˜H = DH(p˜). Differen-
tiating with respect to e¯H and using (A.4), one obtains
dx˜H
de¯H
= DH′
dp˜
de¯H
> 0.
The domestic supply of coal is s˜Hc = S
H
c (p˜c). Differentiating with respect to e¯
H and
using (A.5), one obtains
ds˜Hg
de¯H
= SH′c
dp˜c
de¯H
> 0.
By (10), the domestic supply of gas is s˜Hg = S
H
g (p˜−θg τ˜H). Differentiating with respect
to e¯H , one obtains ds˜Hg /de¯
H = SH′g
(
dp˜/de¯H − θgdτ˜H/de¯H
)
, which, using the expressions
in (A.2), becomes
ds˜Hg
de¯H
=
−SH′g (A2 + θgA1)
A1A4 −A2A3
.
In this expression, (A.1) allows to rewrite A2 + θgA1 as follows:
A2 + θgA1 = (θc − θg)
(
S ′c −DF ′
)
+ θgD
H′.
Since, by (A.3), A1A4 − A2A3 > 0, and, by assumption, SH′g > 0, it follows that
ds˜Hg /de¯
H and (θc − θg)
(
S ′c −DF ′
)
+θgD
H′ have opposite signs. Therefore, ds˜Hg /de¯
H < 0—
as when a reduction in e¯H causes an increase in gas production s˜Hg —is equivalent to
(θc − θg)
(
S ′c −DF ′
)
+ θgD
H′ > 0, which is also
θc − θg
θg
>
−DH′
S ′c −DF ′
,
from which condition (13) is obtained after using the elasticity notations presented in the
main text immediately after Proposition 1. This proves the proposition.
B Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1
(14) and (15), together with the expression of p˜c in (9), imply the following expression of
the world CO2 emissions:
e˜W = e¯H + θcD
F (p˜− θcτ˜H).
Differentiating with respect to e¯H , one obtains de˜W/de¯H = 1+θcD
F ′
(
dp˜/de¯H − θcdτ˜H/de¯H
)
,
which, after using the expressions in (A.2), becomes
deW
de¯H
= 1− θcD
F ′ (A2 + θcA1)
A1A4 − A2A3
.
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After replacing the terms given in (A.1), and using the simplifying notation r ≡ (θc −
θg)/θg, simple manipulations allow to obtain
de˜W
de¯H
=
θ2cS
H′
g
A1A4 − A2A3
1
(1 + r)2
P (r) (B.1)
with
P (r) = S ′c
(
1− D
H′
SH′g
)
r2 +
(
DF ′ − 2S
′
cD
H′
SH′g
)
r −DH′
(
1 +
S ′c
SH′g
)
, (B.2)
which has been reported in (18). In (B.1), A1A4 − A2A3 > 0 by (A.3), and, by assump-
tion, SH′g > 0. Therefore, de˜
W/de¯H and P (r) as expressed in (B.2) have the same sign.
After simple manipulations using the elasticity notations of the main text, it follows that
de˜W/de¯H > 0 is equivalent to condition (17). This proves Proposition 2.
The leakage rate, as expressed in (16), can be obtained in a similar way since, by (14),
de˜F
de¯H
=
de˜W
de¯H
− 1;
clearly, this rate is less than 100% when de˜W/de¯H > 0 and more than 100% otherwise.
P (r) in (B.2) is a polynomial of degree two. Since its second degree coefficient
S ′c
(
1−DH′/SH′g
)
is positive, it satisfies lim
r 7→+∞
P (r) = +∞. Moreover, it satisfies P (0) =
−DH′
(
1 + S ′c/S
H′
g
)
> 0.
It follows that P (r)—and, equivalently de˜W/de¯H—can only be negative if it admits
two real roots; in this case, it will be negative for values of r in between these roots. It
is the case if and only if the polynomial’s determinant
∆ = DF ′2 + 4
(
S ′c + S
H′
g −DF ′ −DH′
) S ′cDH′
SH′g
(B.3)
is strictly positive. This positivity condition is expressed in (19). It is clearly a neces-
sary condition for the possibility that de˜W/de¯H be negative, as when the domestic CO2
reduction is counter-productive at the world level, proving the first part of Corollary 1.
If this condition ∆ > 0 is satisfied, the two roots r˜ < ˜¯r of P (r) as labelled in the main
text are
r˜ ≡
2S
′
cD
H′
SH′g
−DF ′ −
√
∆
2S ′c
(
1− DH′
SH′g
) (B.4)
and
˜¯r ≡
2S
′
cD
H′
SH′g
−DF ′ +
√
∆
2S ′c
(
1− DH′
SH′g
) , (B.5)
where ∆ > 0 is given by (B.3).
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These two roots, assuming that they exist so that ∆ > 0 in (B.3), can be shown to
be positive as follows. First, following a famous property of second degree polynomials,
the roots’ product is
r˜˜¯r =
−DH′
(
1 + S
′
c
SH′g
)
S ′c
(
1− DH′
SH′g
) ,
which is positive, implying that the two roots have the same sign. Second, following
another famous property of second degree polynomials, the roots’ sum is
r˜ + ˜¯r =
2S
′
cD
H′
SH′g
−DF ′
S ′c
(
1− DH′
SH′g
) . (B.6)
In the latter fraction, the denominator is positive by our assumptions. At the same
time, the positivity of ∆ in (B.3) can easily be shown to imply the inequality DF ′ <
4S
′
cD
H′
SH′g
(
1 + D
H′
DF ′
− S
′
c+S
′
g
SH′gc
)
, where the fact that the term between parentheses is less than
one implies, in turn, DF ′ < 4S
′
cD
H′
SH′g
< 2S
′
cD
H′
SH′g
. It follows that the fraction’s numerator
in (B.6) and, therefore, the roots’ sum are positive. Having already established that the
roots have the same sign, one can conclude that this sign is positive.
In fact, the analysis and comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 in the main text revealed
that 0 < r˜0 < r˜.
To sum up, provided ∆ > 0—and, therefore, condition (19) in Corollary 1—P (r) is
strictly negative—and, therefore, so is de˜W/de¯H—for and only for all rates of pollution
increase r = (θc − θg)/θg within the non-empty positive interval (r˜, ˜¯r). This proves the
second point of Corollary 1.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Totally differentiating the equilibrium condition (23) with respect to p˜, τ˜H and τ˜F , and
rearranging terms, one obtains
A1dp˜+ A2dτ˜
H + θcD
F ′dτ˜F = 0, (C.1)
where the notations defined in (A.1) have been used.
Proposition 3 assumes that the Foreign country’s emissions are limited as per (24),
which implies that the coal price p˜c = p˜ − θcτ˜H + θcτ˜F therein, as given in (22), is held
unchanged. Its total derivative with respect to p˜, τ˜H and τ˜F is, therefore, zero:
dp˜− θcdτ˜H + θcdτ˜F = 0. (C.2)
Combining equations (C.1) and (C.2) by substituting dp˜, one obtains
dτ˜F
dτ˜H
=
−DH′ + θc−θg
θc
SH′g
−DH′ + S ′c + SH′g
,
from which equation (25) is derived after using the elasticity notations of the main text.
This proves Proposition 3.
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